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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Preliminary Thoughts
Contrary to the perfect competition paradigm, in many markets, namely retail markets, price
information is not freely available to consumers. To the contrary, obtaining price information
typically requires some costly action by consumers, like visiting the vendors’ premises. Sev-
eral mechanisms have emerged to address this problem. Firms may advertise their prices to
consumers. Alternatively, firms may develop a reputation for having low prices. Or still, third
parties may emerge, whose job is to collect and disseminate price information. The impact on
consumer prices of some of the characteristics of the information provided by these third parties,
to which we will refer as price-comparison search platforms, is the subject of this article.
Price-comparison search platforms are not new and have taken many formats. The Kelley
Blue Book for automobiles is a well known example of the many publications that exist dedi-
cated to collecting, comparing and disseminating information on a product’s price in industries
such as: automobile, consumer electronics, real estate, etc. More recently, the development of
the internet allowed the emergence of price-comparison web sites or search engines.1 There are
now several online platforms covering products like: hotel rooms, airplane tickets or consumer
electronics.
Price-comparison search platforms can reduce search costs and enhance the ability of con-
sumers to observe and compare the prices of a large number of vendors. This can discipline
vendors, and put downward pressure on prices.2 Presumably, the larger the number of ven-
dors whose price a price-comparison search platform lists, and that thereby consumers can
compare, the more competitive the market becomes. However, there are several reasons for
price-comparison search platforms to cover only a small subset of the market, and to collect
and report information favorable to certain vendors.3
In many retail markets there is a very large number of active vendors. It is not feasible
for a price comparison platform to cover all of them. Usually, the most one can aspire to is
to collect a representative sample of prices. In addition, search platforms are profit seeking
entities. Hence, depending on the type of clients they cater to, consumers or vendors, price-
comparison platforms will collect and report the type of information that makes them more
attractive to their clients.
Consider the case where price-comparison platform are magazines that review consumer
products. Some, financed mostly by the cover price, are independent in their evaluations, while
others, financed mostly by advertisements, are less independent. Still others, financed both by
the cover price and by advertising, may not be completely independent, buy may still have a
high level of independence. All of these types of magazines coexist. Well informed consumers
can distinguish between the various types magazines. Less informed consumers are probably
1. Price comparison search engines, also known as shopping agents or shopping robots, are a class of search
engines, which retrieve, store, and return information, namely about prices, of various products.
2. The search literature has no simple prediction about the relation between search costs, price levels, or price
dispersion (Pereira, 2005; Samuelson and Zhang, 1992).
3. For price-comparison search engines see, e.g., Bradlow and Schmittlein (1999) and Lawrence and Giles
(1998, 1999).
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unable to do so.
Recently, in several jurisdictions, rivals and competition authorities brought various antitrust
cases against Google.4 More specifically, it was alleged that Google’s general search engine
lowered the ranking of unpaid search results of competing services, e.g., price comparison
shopping services, and gave preferential placement to the results of its own services. This
conduct would prevent consumers from seeing the most relevant results to their search queries,
and hinder its rivals’ ability to compete. In addition, it was also alleged that Google lowered
the quality score for sponsored search results of competing services. This would raise the price
paid to Google by advertisers. These antitrust cases reinforce the perspective that the distortion
information by these platforms is not just a hypothetical possibility.
Several theoretical and empirical papers, which are reviewed below, have studied the impact
of individual strategies on prices from both the consumer’s and the producer’s point of view.
However, the impact of the resulting informational patterns (complete vs incomplete or unbi-
ased vs selective coverage) on prices has not been studied in a systematic way. Especially, the
robustness of predictions obtained under the assumptions of partial equilibrium search models
has not been challenged in the presence of more realistic settings in which agents, rather than
optimizing under unlimited calculus ability, they learn through feedback from past actions. We
undertake this task here, exposing a sample of participants, to a context closely replicating the
conditions of a partial equilibrium model set up to capture the aforementioned cases of com-
plete, incomplete and selective coverage of vendor prices in an oligopolistic market.
1.2. Overview
In this article, we examine, theoretically and experimentally, the impact on market prices of
some informational features of the sample collected and provided by price-comparison search
platforms, namely: (i) the number of vendors covered, and (ii) whether the vendors were picked
randomly. In addition, our article also reexamines the impact of the number of vendors in the
market on prices, distinguishing between types of consumers.
We develop a partial equilibrium search model, related to Burdett and Judd (1983) and
Varian (1980), to discuss the implications of price-comparison search platforms providing con-
sumers with incomplete and selective information. There is: (i) one price-comparison search
platform, (ii) a finite number of identical vendors, and (iii) a large number of consumers of two
types: searchers and non-searchers. Vendors choose prices. The search platform collects and
lists a sample of market prices. Searchers use the search platform, and buy at the lowest listed
price. Non-searchers buy from a vendor chosen at random. In equilibrium, vendors randomize
between charging a higher price and selling only to non-searchers, and charging a lower price
to try to sell also to searchers.
In the benchmark case, the search platform has complete coverage, i.e., lists all vendors.
We also analyze two other polar cases on how the sample is chosen. First, the case in which
the search platform has incomplete coverage and is unselective, i.e., lists a random subsample
4. E.g., the European Commission, on 30 November 2010, initiated antitrust proceedings against Google
in cases COMP/C-3/39.740, COMP/C-3/39.775 & COMP/C-3/39.768, and on 14 July 2016, initiated antitrust
proceedings against Google’s mother company Alphabet in case AT.39740.
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of vendors. Second, we analyze the case in which the search platform has incomplete coverage
and is selective, i.e., lists a pre-determined subset of vendors.
The theoretical analysis makes several predictions regarding the impact of: (i) the number
of vendors sampled by the search platform, (ii) whether the sample of vendors collected by
the search platform is random, and (iii) the number of vendors in the market. In addition,
the model draws attention to four general counter-intuitive effects. First, there is a conflict of
interests between types of consumers, i.e., between searchers and non-searchers. This makes
it hard to evaluate the welfare impact of these effects. Second, more information, measured
by a wider Internet coverage by the search platform, is not necessarily desirable. It benefits
some consumers, but harms others. Third, and for the same reason, unselective information
about vendors is not necessarily desirable either. Fourth, the effects of entry in these markets
are complex, and depend on the way entry occurs.
We test the model’s predictions in a laboratory experiment designed specifically for that
purpose. The results confirm the predictions about whether the sample is random, and the
impact of the number of active vendor, but reject the predictions about the number of vendors
sampled. Moreover, the data analysis indicates several additional patterns, such as that prices
are lower under selective than under unselective incomplete coverage.
The intuition of some of these results might clash with the common wisdom about the
effects of competition, because our analysis refers to markets where firms play mixed strategies.
However, the results related to the impact of the number of rivals on prices apply more broadly
and are also present in models where firms play pure strategies, such as those of Bagwell and
Lee (2012), Chen and Riordan (2008) and Seade (1980), and documented empirically by Frank
and Salkever (1997) and Grabowski and Vernon (1992).
1.3. Literature Review
The seminal work of Stigler (1961) drew attention to the importance of price information and
search costs for the efficient functioning of markets. This led to the development of several
theoretical models, encompassing various types of search behavior and market equilibria. The
basic search models relevant for our article were developed in the early 1980s by Burdett and
Judd (1983), Varian (1980), Rosenthal (1980) and Stahl (1989). Parallel to this theoretical
research there was also extensive empirical research with both field data, e.g., Dahlby and West
(1986), Lach (2002) and Sorensen (2002), and experimental data, e.g., Harrison and Morgan
(1990) and Schotter and Braunstein (1981).
Several experimental studies have documented the negative relationship between consumer
search and price levels, as well as price dispersion resulting from the coexistence of informed
and uninformed consumers in the market. Two experiments are of particular interest to our re-
search. Cason and Friedman (2003) conducted a laboratory study of Burdett and Judd (1983)’s
model. They used human sellers in all treatments, and human or robot sellers depending on the
treatment. They found that overall the data conforms to the theory, especially when the design
provided for automated optimal search by consumers, thus reducing the noise from human be-
havior on both sides of the market. This inspires our design, which also restricts attention to
behavior on the supply side, by simulating the demand-side behavior. Morgan et al. (2006)
conducted a laboratory study of Varian (1980)’s model. In particular, they evaluated the impact
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of changing the number of firms and the proportion of informed consumers. In all treatments,
they used human sellers and robot buyers. They obtained mixed results in terms of the data
conforming to the theory. The theoretical predictions concerning the impact of firm number
and the proportion of uninformed consumers on equilibrium price distributions were mostly
confirmed. However, observed price distributions exhibit systematic deviations from the corre-
sponding equilibrium predictions.5
The development of the Internet and the emergence of price-comparison search platforms
renewed the interest in this subject both from a theoretical perspective, e.g., Arnold et al. (2011),
Baye and Morgan (2001), Dinlersoz and Pereira (2007), Ellison and Wolitzky (2012), Iyer
and Pazgal (2000) and Janssen and Moraga (2004), and from an empirical perspective, e.g.,
Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000), Brown and Goolsbee (2002), Clay et al. (2002), Clemons et al.
(2002), De los Santos et al. (2013), Ellison and Ellison (2009) and Tang et al. (2010).
Finally, there has also been theoretical research on the impact of the search platform’s strate-
gic behavior on market efficiency, e.g., Armstrong et al. (2009), Athey and Ellison (2011),
Corniere and Taylor (2012), Hagiu and Jullien (2011) or White (2013). In Varian (1980) some
consumers observe one price and others observe all prices. In Burdett and Judd (1983) some
consumers observe one price and others observe two prices. In all of these cases the price sam-
ples are unbiased.6 In our model, the sample of prices that consumers observe: (i) can vary be-
tween one and all prices, and (ii) may be unbiased or biased. These characteristics are intended
to capture the platform’s level of coverage and whether the platform’s interests are aligned with
some vendors or with consumers. None of these characteristics had been previously examined
by the theoretical or experimental literatures.
Hence, our article contributes to the literature by examining, both theoretically and exper-
imentally, the impact on market prices of some informational features of the sample collected
and provided by price-comparison search platforms, namely: (i) the number of vendors covered,
and (ii) whether the vendors were picked randomly. In addition, our article also reexamines the
impact of the number of vendors in the market on prices, distinguishing between types of con-
sumers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the benchmark
model, and in Section 3 we characterize its equilibrium. In Section 4 we conduct the analysis
of the model and its variations. Section 5 analyzes the results of the experiment. Section 6 con-
cludes. Appendices A and B include, respectively, the proofs and the experimental instructions.
5. Orzen (2008) conducted a laboratory study to determine the impact of repeated interaction on Morgan et
al. (2006)’s results, under a fixed-matching protocol. He found that repeated interaction leads to prices above those
predicted by the model in small oligopolies, but does not in larger oligopolies.
6. In Varian (1980) there are finite number of identical firms and a continuum of two types of consumers.
Searchers, can observe all prices at zero cost, while non-searchers, observe only one price. Firms randomize
between charging low prices to try to sell to searchers, and charging high prices to sell only to their share of non-
searchers. In Burdett and Judd (1983) there is a continuum of identical firms and a continuum identical consumers.
With some exogenous probability, each consumer either observes two prices or observes one price. Firms also
randomize between charging low prices and charging high.
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2. THE MODEL
In this section we present the model.
We develop a model that meets two criteria: (i) it captures the main effects of the infor-
mation characteristics of search platforms, and (ii) it generates predictions that can be tested
experimentally. The latter aspect implies a stylized formalism that abstracts from non-testable
behavior.7 Various footnote extensions complement the model’s conciseness.
2.1. The Setting
Consider a market for a homogeneous search good that opens for one period. There are: (i)
one price-comparison search platform, "search platform" for short, (ii) n ≥ 3 vendors, indexed
through subscript j = 1, . . . ,n, and (iii) many consumers.8
The game unfolds as follows. First, vendors choose prices. Second, the search platform
collects and disseminates price information. Third, consumers make their purchases.
2.2. Consumers
There is a unit mass of consumers. Consumers are risk neutral. Each consumer has a unit
demand, and a reservation price of 1. There are 2 types of consumers, differing only with
respect to whether they use the search platform. Non-Searchers, a proportion λ on (0,1), do
not use the search platform, perhaps because they are unaware of its existence, or perhaps
because of the high opportunity cost of their time.9 The other consumers, Searchers, use the
search platform.10
Consumers do not know the prices charged by individual vendors. Searchers use the search
platform to learn the prices of vendors. If the lowest price sampled by the search platform is
no higher than 1, searchers accept the offer and buy; in case of a tie they distribute themselves
randomly among vendors; otherwise they reject the offer and exit the market. Non-searchers
distribute themselves evenly across vendors, i.e., each vendor has a share of non-searchers of 1n .
If offered a price no higher than 1, non-searchers accept the offer and buy; otherwise they reject
the offer and exit the market.
7. In a richer model, the effects of the search platform’s characteristics would be intertwined with other
effects, making it hard, if not impossible, to test them experimentally.
8. The case where several search platforms compete is certainly of interest. We start with the case of a mo-
nopolist search platform because it is easier and leave the case of competing search platforms for further research.
9. To use search platforms consumers incur some cost. In the Blue Book case they have to buy it and spend
some time reading it. In the case of online search platforms they might have to download software and spend time
finding and comparing alternatives.
10. Consumer types can be endogeneized. To use the search platform one must pay α and spend time reading
and processing the information, whose disutility is d. Denote by ε the expected price, by µ the expected minimum
price and let ∆ := ε − µ . The utility of using the search platform and buying is: 1− µ −α − d; the utility of not
using the search platform and buying is 1− ε; otherwise the utility is 0. A consumers uses the search platform if:
d ≤ ∆−α . Let there be two types of consumers. A proportion λ has d = 1 and a proportion 1−λ has d = 0. In
equilibrium, 0 ≤ ∆−α ≤ 1: consumers with d = 0, i.e., searchers, use the search platform, whereas consumers
with d = 1, i.e., non-searchers, do not. It is straightforward to generalize to any finite number of types.
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2.3. Vendors
Vendors are identical and risk neutral. Marginal costs are constant and equal to zero.
Vendors cannot distinguish between searchers and non-searchers.11 Denote by Π j(p), the
expected profit of vendor j when it charges price p on R+0 . A vendor’s strategy is a cumulative
distribution function over prices, Fj(·). Denote the lowest and highest prices on its support by
p j and p¯ j.
12 A vendor’s payoff is its expected profit.
2.4. Price-Comparison Search Platform
The Price-Comparison Search Platform, for a given sample of vendors, collects their names,
addresses and prices and stores it in its database, i.e., in its Index. This information is available
to all of those that access the search platform. The search platform has only an informative role
and is not used to conduct transactions.
Denote by k, the number of vendors the search platform indexes. We will refer to k as the
Size of the Index. The search platform may be of one of the following three types:
(i). Complete Coverage: The search platform has Complete Coverage if it indexes all vendors
present in the market: k = n. Otherwise it has Incomplete Coverage: 1≤ k < n.
(ii). Unselective Incomplete Coverage: A search platform with incomplete coverage has a
Unselective Sample if, for 1 < k < n, it indexes each of the n vendors with the same prob-
ability:
(n−1
k−1
)
/
(n
k
)
= kn . If the search platform has incomplete coverage and an unselective
sample, we say that it has Unselective Incomplete Coverage.
(iii). Selective Incomplete Coverage: A search platform with incomplete coverage has a Selec-
tive Sample if, for 1 < k < n, it indexes vendors j = 1, ...,k, and does not index vendors
j = k+ 1, ...,n. If the search platform has incomplete coverage and a selective sample,
we say that it has Selective Incomplete Coverage. 13
Complete Coverage is a benchmark case, where the search platform has comprehensive
information. Unselective and Selective Incomplete Coverage are two polar cases on how the
sample is chosen.
11. In our context it is unclear how consumers could be distinguished. Consider Kelley’s blue book. First,
searchers have no incentive to signal their type. They are perfectly informed and will buy from the cheapest car
dealer anyway. Second, non-searchers have no way of credibly mimicking searchers. If they were informed they
would simply go to the cheapest car dealer. Third, vendors have no incentive in using a screening strategy like:
post a high price and if confronted, through haggling, with a searcher lower the price. If a vendor posts a high
price it will not be visited by searchers. The Internet increased the ability to discriminate consumers, particularly
when the search platform is used to conduct transactions, which is not our case. However, this enhanced ability is
mitigated by the consumers’ aversion to blatant forms of discrimination.
12. As it is well known this game has no equilibrium in pure strategies (Varian, 1980).
13. For this parametrization, knowing the probability with which vendors are indexed, implies knowing the
identity of the indexed vendors. It is possible to introduce selectiveness, such that knowing the probability with
which vendors are indexed does not imply knowing the identity of the indexed vendors. E.g., all vendors can be
indexed with a non-degenerate probability, which is higher for some vendors than for others. Our parametrization
has the advantage of yielding a closed form solution.
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Consumers and vendors know the type of the search platform. In particular, under Unselec-
tive Incomplete Coverage, vendors know the probability with which they are indexed, but do
not observe the identity of the indexed vendors, before choosing prices. Under Selective Incom-
plete Coverage, vendors know the identity of the indexed vendors before choosing prices. In
the cases of Complete Coverage and Unselective Incomplete Coverage, vendors are identical.
In the case of Selective Incomplete Coverage, vendors are asymmetric.
Denote by τ the type of the search platform, and let ‘c’, mean Complete Coverage, ‘u’ mean
Unselective Incomplete Coverage, and ‘s’ mean Selective Incomplete Coverage, i.e., τ belongs
to {c,u,s}. We will use superscripts ‘c’, ‘u’, ‘s’, to denote variables or values associated with
the cases where the search platform has that type.14
3. CHARACTERIZATION OF EQUILIBRIUM
The equilibrium concept is Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, where vendors choose price
distributions.
Denote by φ τj , the probability of firm j being indexed, given that the search platform is of
type τ:
φ τj =

k
n if τ = c,u
1 if τ = s and j = 1, . . . ,k
0 if τ = s and j = k+1, . . . ,n.
Ignoring ties,15 the expected profit of a vendor that charges p≤ 1 is:16
Π j(p) = p
λ
n
+ p(1−λ )φ τj [1−F(p)]k−1. (1)
Denote by lτj the lowest price vendor j is willing to charge to sell to both types of consumers
when the search platform has type τ , i.e., lτj [
λ
n +(1−λ )φ τj ]− λn ≡ 0.
In equilibrium:17
p
λ
n
+ p(1−λ )φ τj [1−Fτj (p)]k−1 =
λ
n
. (2)
Denote by δ (p), the degenerate distribution with unit mass on p.18 The next proposition
characterizes the equilibrium for the model.
14. To endogeneize (τ,k,α) consider the following four stage game. Stages 2, 3 and 4 unfold as previously
described. In stage 1 the search platform chooses (τ,k,α). From footnote 10, non-searchers do not use the search
platform for any 0≤ α; searchers use the search platform if, 0≤ α ≤ ∆τ . Hence: α∗ = ∆τ . From Proposition 1, ∆τ
is a function of k: ∆τ(k). Denote by Cτ(k) the cost of indexing k vendors of a type τ search platform. The profit of
indexing k vendors is: (1−λ )∆τ(k)−Cτ(k). Given enough concavity there is unique profit maximizing k∗. Given
(α∗,k∗), the search platform can compute the maximum profit for τ = u,s and choose the most profitable.
15. Lemma 1(ii) in the appendix shows that Fτj (·) is continuous.
16. Vendor j that charges price p≤ 1 sells to searchers: (i) if it belongs to the set of vendors indexed by search
platform, which occurs with probability φ τj , and (ii) if it has the lowest price among the indexed vendors, which
occurs with probability [1−F(p)]k−1. Thus, vendor j’s expected share of searchers is: (1−λ )φ τj [1−F(p)]k−1.
17. From Lemma 1(iv) in the appendix.
18. Function δ (·) is the Heavside function, i.e., the CDF of the Dirac delta function.
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Proposition 1. (i) for τ = c,u and j = 1, . . . ,n, and for τ = s and j = 1, . . . ,k:
Fτj (p;n,k) =

0 ⇐ p < lτj
1−
[(
1
nφ τj
)(
λ
1−λ
)(
1− p
p
)] 1k−1
⇐ lτj ≤ p < 1
1 ⇐ 1≤ p,
with
lτj (n) =
λ
λ +(1−λ )nφ τj
;
(ii) for τ = s and j = k+1, . . . ,n, Fsj (p;n,k) = δ (1). 
Under Selective Incomplete Coverage, vendors j = k+1, . . . ,n, are not indexed for sure, and
therefore have no access to searchers. Since these vendors can only sell to non-searchers, which
are captive consumers, they charge the reservation price. Vendors j = 1, . . . ,k, under Selec-
tive Incomplete Coverage, and all vendors in the cases of Complete Coverage and Unselective
Incomplete Coverage, are indexed with positive probability. Hence, they face the trade-off of
charging a high price and selling only to non-searchers, or charging a low price to try to sell
also to searchers, which leads them to randomize over prices.
4. ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the model for the 3 types of search platforms.
4.1. Complete Coverage
In the case of Complete Coverage the model is similar to Varian (1980).19
Rewrite (2) as:
p(1−λ )[1−Fc(p)]n−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Benefit
=
λ
n
(1− p).︸ ︷︷ ︸
Opportunity Cost
(3)
If a vendor charges a price p lower than the consumers’ reservation price, 1, it has the lowest
price in the market with probability [1−Fc(p)]n−1, sells to (1− λ ) searchers, and earns an
additional expected profit of p(1−λ )[1−Fc(p)]n−1: the Volume of Sales effect. However, it
loses (1− p) per non-searcher, and a total of (1− p)λn : the per Consumer Profit effect. The
volume of sales effect is the marginal benefit of charging a price lower than the consumers’
reservation price, and the per consumer profit effect is the marginal cost.
Denote by ε , the expected price, i.e., the expected price paid by non-searchers. And denote
by µ , the expected minimum price, i.e., the expected price paid by searchers.
The next Remark collects two useful observations.
Remark 1. (i) λεc+(1−λ )µc = λ ; (ii) µc < εc. 
19. See also Rosenthal (1980) and Stahl (1989).
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The first part of Remark 1 says that the average price paid in the market, λεc+(1−λ )µc,
equals the proportion of non-searchers, λ .20 This has two implications. First, only shifts in
the proportion of non-searchers change the average price paid in the market. Second, shifts
in any other parameter, such as the number of vendors, n, induce the expected prices paid by
searchers and non-searchers to move in opposite directions. A conflict of interests between
types of consumers is an important consequence of this model.
The second part of Remark 1, says that the expected price paid by searchers, µc = lc +∫ 1
lc(1−Fc)nd p, is lower than the expected price paid by non-searchers, εc = lc+
∫ 1
lc(1−Fc)d p.
The search platform allows searchers to compare the prices of all vendors in its index, and
choose the cheapest vendor. This induces competition among vendors and puts downward
pressure on prices, which benefits consumers using the search platform.
4.2. Unselective Incomplete Coverage
In this subsection, we analyze the case of Unselective Incomplete Coverage, and compare it with
the case of Complete Coverage. We show that Unselective Incomplete Coverage compared with
Complete Coverage, increases the expected price paid by searchers, and decreases the expected
price paid by non-searchers.
The price distribution for the case in which the market consists of n vendors, and the pri-
ce-comparison search platform has an unselective index of size k ≤ n, is identical to the price
distribution for the case in which the search platform has Complete Coverage, k = n, and the
market consists of k vendors: Fu(·;n,k) = Fc(·;k). For further reference, we present this obser-
vation in the next corollary.
Corollary 1. Fu(·;n,k) = Fc(·;k). 
The next proposition analyzes the impact of changes in the size of the index, k, and the
number of vendors, n.
Proposition 2. (i) lu(k)< lu(k−1); (ii) µu(n,k)< µu(n,k−1) and εu(n,k)> εu(n,k−
1); (iii) Fu(·;n,k) = Fu(·;n+1,k). 
Rewrite (2) as:
p(1−λ )
(
k
n
)
[1−Fu(p)]k−1 = λ
n
(1− p). (4)
From (4), an unselective decrease in the size of the index has two impacts. First, for indexed
vendors, the decrease in the size of the index reduces the number of rivals with which a vendor
has to compete to sell to searchers from k− 1 to k− 2. This increases the probability that an
indexed vendor will have the lowest price, (1−Fu)k−1, which increases the Volume of Sales
effect. The first impact leads vendors to shift probability mass from higher to lower prices.
As a consequence, the price distribution shifts to the left, as shown in Figure 1. Second, the
20. Actually, it equals the proportion of non-searchers times the reservation price: λ ·1. Also, since marginal
cost is 0, and demand is inelastic and unitary, the average price paid in the market equals the average market profits.
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FIGURE 1
Unselective Incomplete Coverage: A decrease in the size of the index: the first impact causes the distribution to
shift from Fc(·;n) to A, and the second impact causes the distribution to shift from A to Fu(·;n,k).
decrease in the size of the index reduces the probability that a given vendor is indexed from
k
n to
k−1
n , which reduces the Volume of Sales effect. The second impact leads vendors to raise
the lower bound of the support, and to shift probability mass from lower to higher prices. As
a consequence, the price distribution rotates, as shown in Figure 1. The total impact of an
unselective decrease in the size of the index is to cause the price distribution to rotate counter
clock-wise.21
The increase in the lower bound of the support, lu(k)< lu(k−1), raises the expected price
paid by searchers, µu(n,k)< µu(n,k−1). However, from Remark 1(i), the average price paid
in the market remains constant and equal to λ . This implies that the expected price by non-
searchers decreases, εu(n,k) > εu(n,k− 1).22 Recall that vendors now charge lower prices
with a higher probability. Searchers and non-searchers have conflicting interests with respect
to Unselective Incomplete Coverage, as compared with Complete Coverage. Searchers prefer a
large to a small unselective index, and non-searchers prefer a small to a large unselective index.
Under Unselective Incomplete Coverage, the equilibrium price distribution does not depend
on the number of vendors in the market, Fu(·;n,k) = Fu(·;n+1,k). This result is unexpected.
The probability with which a vendor is indexed, k/n, depends on the number of vendors. Be-
sides, each vendor’s share of non-searchers, λ/n, also depends on the number of vendors. But
from (4), n cancels out, and only the number of vendors whose price searchers compare mat-
ters. Rosenthal (1980) assumed that the increase in the number of vendors is accompanied by
a proportional increase in the measure of non-searchers. In his setting, an increase in the num-
ber of vendors induces first-order stochastically dominating shifts in the price distribution, and
therefore higher prices for both types of consumers. The contrast between his and this result
21. See Guimara˜es (1996) for a related discussion.
22. See Morgan et al. (2006) for a related discussion.
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illustrates another important property of this model. In this sort of markets, the impact of entry
depends critically on the way entry occurs.
The next corollary compares the cases of Complete Coverage and Unselective Incomplete
Coverage.
Corollary 2. (i) lc(n)< lu(k); (ii) µc(n)< µu(n,k) and εc(n)> εu(n,k). 
Given that Fu(·;n,k) = Fc(·;k), comparing the price distributions under Unselective Incom-
plete Coverage, Fu(·;n,k), and under Complete Coverage, Fc(·;n), is equivalent to comparing
Fu(·;n,k) and Fu(·;n,n), i.e., is equivalent to analyzing the impact of an increase in the size
of the index, under Unselective Incomplete Coverage. Thus, compared with Complete Cover-
age, Unselective Incomplete Coverage causes the price-comparison to rotate counter-clockwise,
which increases the expected price paid by searchers, µc(n) < µu(n,k), and decreases the ex-
pected price paid by non-searchers, εc(n)> εu(n,k).
4.3. Selective Incomplete Coverage
In this subsection, we analyze the case of Selective Incomplete Coverage, and compare it with
the other two cases. We show that Selective Incomplete Coverage, compared with both Uns-
elective Incomplete Coverage and with Complete Coverage, decreases the expected price paid
by searchers and non-searchers that buy from indexed vendors, and increases the expected price
paid by non-searchers that buy from non-indexed vendors.
The next proposition analyzes the impact of changes in the size of the index, k, and the
number of vendors, n.
Proposition 3. (i) For j = 1, . . . ,k, Fsj (·;n,k)≤ Fsj (·;n,k−1); (ii) µsj(n,k−1)< µsj(n,k)
and εsj(n,k−1)≤ εsj(n,k); (iii) For j = 1, . . . ,k,Fsj (·;n+1,k)≥ Fsj (·;n,k); (iv) µsj(n+1,k)<
µsj(n,k) and ε
s
j(n+1,k)≤ εsj(n,k), with strict inequality for j = 1, . . . ,k. 
Rewrite (2) as
p(1−λ )[1−Fsj (p)]k−1 =
λ
n
(1− p). (5)
From (5), a decrease in the size of a selective index, k, increases the probability that an
indexed vendor has the lowest price, (1−Fsj )k−1, which increases the Volume of Sales effect.
This leads indexed vendors to shift probability mass from higher to lower prices. As a con-
sequence, the distribution shifts in the first-order stochastically dominated sense, Fsj (p;n,k) ≤
Fsj (p;n,k− 1), as shown in Figure 2a. This decreases the expected price paid by searchers,
µsj(n,k− 1) < µsj(n,k), and by non-searchers that buy from an indexed vendor, εsj(n,k− 1) <
εsj(n,k), j = 1, . . . ,k, and leaves unchanged the expected price paid by non-searchers that buy
from a non-indexed vendor, εsj(n,k−1) = εsj(n,k), j = k+1, . . . ,n.
From (5), an increase in the number of vendors in the market, n, leaving fixed the size of a
selective index, k, reduces the per Consumer Profit effect. This leads indexed vendors to reduce
the lower bound of the support, and to shift probability mass from higher to lower prices. As a
consequence, the distribution shifts in the first-order stochastically dominated sense, Fsj (p;n+
1,k)≥ Fsj (p;n,k), as shown in Figure 2b. This decreases the expected price paid by searchers,
12
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FIGURE 2
Selective Incomplete Coverage: (a) A decrease in the size of the index. For j = 1, . . . ,k distributions Fsj (·;n,k−1)
are first-order stochastically dominated by distributions Fsj (·;n,k). (b) An increase in the number of firms. For
j = 1, . . . ,k distributions Fsj (·;n+1,k) are first-order stochastically dominated by distributions Fsj (·;n,k).
µsj(n+ 1,k) < µ
s
j(n,k), and by non-searchers that buy from an indexed vendor, ε
s
j(n+ 1,k) <
εsj(n,k), j = 1, . . . ,k, and leaves unchanged the expected price paid by non-searchers that buy
from a non-indexed vendor, εsj(n+1,k) = ε
s
j(n,k), j = k+1, . . . ,n.
23
The next corollary compares the case of Selective Incomplete Coverage, with the two previ-
ous cases.
Corollary 3. (i) ls(n) = lc(n); (ii) For j = 1, . . . ,k, Fsj (·;n,k)≥max{Fc(·;n),Fu(·;n,k)},
and for j= k+1, . . . ,n, Fsj (·;n,k)≤min{Fc(·;n),Fu(·;n,k)}; (iii) µsj(n,k)<min{µc(n),µu(n,k)};
(iv) For j= 1, . . . ,k, εsj(n,k)<min{εc(n),εu(n,k)}, and for j= k+1, . . . ,n, εsj(n,k)>max{εc(n),
εu(n,k)}. 
For indexed vendors, Selective Incomplete Coverage involves only the positive impact of
the Volume of Sales effect, which leads vendors to shift probability mass from higher to lower
prices. Thus, the price distribution of indexed vendors, Fsj (·;n,k), is first-order stochastically
dominated by price distribution under Complete Coverage, Fc(·;n), and by the price distribu-
tion under Unselective Incomplete Coverage Fu(·;n,k), as shown in Figure 3. Searchers buy
from the cheapest indexed vendor. Thus, the expected price paid by searchers is smaller under
Selective Incomplete Coverage, than under either Complete Coverage, or Unselective Incom-
plete Coverage. For non-searchers that buy from an indexed vendor, the expected price is also
smaller. For non-searchers that buy from a non-indexed vendor, the expected price paid is
higher.
23. As n→ ∞, ls→ 0, and Fsj converges weakly to δ (1), j = 1, . . . ,k.
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FIGURE 3
Comparison among the three types of coverage. For j= 1, . . . ,k distributions Fsj (·;n,k) are first-order stochastically
dominated by distributions Fc(·;n) and Fu(·;n,k).
5. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
We experimentally test the predictions of the theoretical model in the presence of interacting
human agents. Especially, we are interested in the robustness of predictions obtained under the
assumptions of the partial equilibrium search model analysed in the preceding pages in a more
realistic setting in which agents, rather than optimizing under unlimited calculus ability, they
learn through feedback from past actions. We undertake this task here, exposing a sample of
participants, to a context closely replicating the conditions of the theoretical model in a set up
which allows us to replicate the aforementioned cases of complete, incomplete/unselective and
selective coverage of vendor prices in an oligopolistic market. In this section, we describe the
design and report the results of the laboratory experiment.
5.1. Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted at the Laboratori d’Economia Experimental (LEE), of the Uni-
versitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain. A population of 144 subjects was recruited in advance among
the students of Business Administration, and other business-related courses taught at this uni-
versity.
Table 1 reports the design parameters of each treatment and the moments of the distributions
of average price and minimum price holding under the assumptions of the theoretical model pre-
sented in the previous sections. It can be seen that the experiment was run under 8 treatments,
each one consisting of a single session with 18 subjects. Although a single session was run per
treatment, our hypothesis testing is based on comparisons between groups of sessions. It should
be noted that the hypotheses concerning differences between selective and unselective incom-
plete coverage are tested based on differences across three different treatment pairs (T2-T3,
T4-T5 and T6-T8). Similarly, differences between complete and incomplete unselective cov-
14
erage are also studied by comparing three different treatment pairs (T1-T2, T4-T5 and T4-T7).
The same is true for comparative statics concerning the number of firms on the index and in the
industry. Each session consisted of the same setup repeated 50 periods. Each period, depending
on the treatment, markets of 3 or 6 subjects were randomly formed. This strangers matching
protocol was adopted, in order to maintain the experimental environment as close as possible
to the one-shot framework of the theoretical model. Subjects were perfectly informed of the
underlying model, and their only decision variable in each period was price. The instructions to
the subjects are provided in Appendix B).
Consumer behavior was simulated by the local network server.24 There were 1,200 simu-
lated consumers.25 For representation and interface reasons, and in order to offer a fine grid
for the strategy space, the consumers’ reservation price was normalized to 1,000 rather than to
1. Half of the consumers were assumed to be searchers, and the other half were non-searchers,
i.e., λ = 1/2.
Under Complete Coverage, the search platform’s index contained the prices of all subjects,
i.e., k = n= 3 or k = n= 6, depending on the treatment. Under Incomplete Coverage, the index
contained the prices of only a subset of all subjects, i.e., k = 2 for n = 3, and k = 2 or k = 4 for
n = 6. Under Unselective Incomplete Coverage, subjects were informed whether they where
indexed after each period’s prices were set. Under Selective Incomplete Coverage, subjects
were informed on the composition of the index before prices were set. Both in the case of
Unselective or Selective Coverage, after each period’s prices were set, subjects were informed
on own and rival prices, as well as own quantities sold and profits earned.26
In order to make the earnings of each period equally interesting, subjects’ monetary rewards
were calculated from the cumulative earnings over 10 randomly selected periods. Individual
rewards ranged between 15 e and 50 e. This made the experiment worth participating in, and
increased subjects’ motivation to earn the highest payoff possible.
5.2. Testable Hypotheses
Denote by εt , the expected price in treatment t; by ε int the expected price of indexed firms in
treatment t; by εnit the expected price of non-indexed firms in treatment t; and by µt the expected
minimum price in treatment t, where t = 1, . . . ,8.
Regarding the most well known result of this framework which has also been explicitly
tested by Morgan et al. (2006), we test the basic or consistency hypothesis:
HC: Under Complete Coverage, an increase in the number of vendors: (i) decreases the
expected minimum price: µ4 < µ1; (ii) increases the average price: ε4 > ε1.
Regarding Unselective Incomplete Coverage we test:
24. We programmed software using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) in order to organize strategy submission, de-
mand simulation, feedback, and data collection.
25. In order to avoid problems associated with the discreteness of the resulting demands, we use a larger
number of consumers than that used by Morgan et al. (2006).
26. Subjects observe their rivals’ prices for two reasons. First, for realism. Second, in order to achieve faster
convergence to experienced play.
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HU1: Under Unselective Incomplete Coverage, a decrease in the size of the index: (i)
increases the expected minimum price: µ4 < µ5 < µ7 and µ1 < µ2; (ii) decreases the expected
price: ε4 > ε5 > ε7 and ε1 > ε2.
HU2: Under Unselective Incomplete Coverage, the equilibrium price distribution is in-
dependent of the number of vendors present in the market: µ2 = µ7 and ε2 = ε7.
Regarding Selective Incomplete Coverage we test:
HB1: Under Selective Incomplete Coverage, a decrease in the size of the index: (i) de-
creases the expected minimum price: µ4 > µ6 > µ8 and µ1 > µ3; (ii) decreases the expected
price of indexed vendors: ε4 > ε in6 > ε
in
8 and ε1 > ε
in
3 ; (iii) leaves unchanged the expected price
of non-indexed vendors: εni6 = ε
ni
8 = 1 and ε
ni
3 = 1.
HB2: Under Selective Incomplete Coverage, an increase in the number of vendors in the
market: (i) decreases the expected minimum price: µ3 > µ8; (ii) decreases the expected price
of indexed vendors: ε in3 > ε
in
8 .
We also test the general hypothesis:
HG: (i) The expected minimum price is smaller under Selective Incomplete Coverage,
than under Unselective Incomplete Coverage: µ5 > µ6 and µ7 > µ8 and µ2 > µ3; (ii) The
expected price of indexed vendors is smaller under Selective Incomplete Coverage, than under
Unselective Incomplete Coverage: ε5 > ε in6 , and ε7 > ε
in
8 , and ε2 > ε
in
3 .
5.3. Experimental Results
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics regarding all treatments. The 20 initial periods are
dropped from the data set reported here in order to eliminate learning dynamics and guarantee
that observations had reached the necessary stability.27 Seven conclusions emerge from the
experimental observations.
Observation 1. In quantitative terms, there are systematic differences between the em-
pirical and the theoretical results. 
This conclusion can be qualified in at least two alternative ways. First, inspection of the
t-tests in Table 1 shows that with the exception of the average price for treatments 4 and 6, all
estimated means of average and minimum prices are significantly different from their theoretical
values.
27. We focus here on the comparative static results that can be tested by our data. The dynamic properties of
individual behavior are studied in detail by García-Gallego et al. (2014), applying specific theoretical results by
Janssen and Moraga-González (2004), Benaïm et al. (2009) and Hopkins and Seymour (2002) on the stability of
learning dynamics in the framework of search models.
17
Second, from Figure 4 we see that, in a strict sense, none of the theoretical distributions
completely lies within the confidence regions built.28 As we will see bellow, the divergence
between predicted and observed behavior, is not incompatible with confirmation of most com-
parative statics predictions of the theoretical model. As pointed out by Orzen and Sefton (2008),
several experimental studies, like Cason and Friedman (2003) and Morgan et al. (2006), have
reported that mixed strategy equilibria are successful predictors of the observed comparative
statics obtained from laboratory experiments. However, this observation seems to ignore the
phenomenon reported here concerning systematic deviations between theoretical and observed
price distributions. Recently, Fonseca and Normann (2008) also obtained deviations of observed
price distributions from those predicted by the corresponding mixed strategy equilibrium. Ear-
lier, Huck et al. (2004) had also found quantitative differences between theoretical and observed
behavior, while their experiments confirmed the predicted comparative statics with respect to
the number of firms in the market.
The empirical distributions rotate clock-wise compared to the theoretical ones. In the case
of treatments 2 and 3, the empirical distribution “almost” first-order stochastically dominates
the theoretical distribution. This rotation indicates the presence of more density on both tails of
distributions of observed prices, than the theoretical model would have predicted. On one hand,
in some treatments a large number of observations lie below the infimum of the support of the
theoretical distributions, lτ , e.g., in treatments 1, 4, 5 and 6. On the other hand, a large number
of observations are at the maximum price, p j = 1. This behavior is specially pronounced in
treatments 4, 5, 6, and 7. In line with the way in which the empirical distributions rotate,
most of the empirical price distributions have higher standard deviations than the corresponding
theoretical ones. See Table 1.
We also found a difference between the expected and the observed behavior of subjects
that knew beforehand that they would not be indexed under Selective Incomplete Coverage. In
treatments 6 and 8, 8% of the observed prices of these subjects were different from p j = 1. We
suspect that most of these observations were mistakes, as many of these subjects only deviated
from the degenerate equilibrium strategy once or twice. But in treatment 3, nearly 30% of the
prices of these subjects were different from p j = 1, and four of these individuals always choose
prices lower than p j = 1. Clearly, hypothesis HB1 (iii) was not supported by the experimental
data.
Observation 2. The data supports the model’s predictions regarding changes in the num-
ber of firms present in the market. 
From Table 2, it follows that: (i) µ2 = µ7 and ε2 = ε7, (ii) µ3 > µ8 and ε in3 > ε
in
8 , (iii) µ1 > µ4
and ε1 < ε4. This implies that the data supports hypotheses: HC, HU2, and HB2.
Consider in particular the consistency hypothesis, HC: under Complete Coverage, an in-
crease in the number of vendors increases the average price and decreases the expected min-
imum price. This conclusion can also be gleaned from the inspection of Figure 5. This non-
trivial result was also obtained by Morgan et al. (2006).
28. Intervals surrounding the corresponding empirical cumulative distributions at a maximum distance defined
by the 1% critical values of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
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FIGURE 4
Theoretical (solid lines) and Empirical (dashed line) Price Distributions. Empirical distributions are surrounded
with a confidence region built from the 1% critical values of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
Observation 3. The data supports the model’s predictions regarding the comparison be-
tween Unselective Incomplete Coverage and Selective Incomplete Coverage. 
From Table 2, it follows that: (i) µ3 < µ2 and ε in3 < ε2, (ii) µ6 = µ5 and ε
in
6 = ε5, (iii) µ8 < µ7
and ε in8 < ε7. The data support hypothesis HG: the average and the average minimum prices are
weakly lower under Selective Incomplete Coverage than under Unselective Incomplete Cover-
age. Both types of consumers, searchers and non-searchers, are better off if the index is selective
than if it is unselective. The same conclusion can be gleaned from the inspection of Figure 6.
Observation 4. The data does not support the model’s predictions regarding changes in
the size of the index. 
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TABLE 2
t-tests of Equality of Means of Average Prices
Average prices Minimum prices
H0 H1 t-test H0 H1 t-test d. f.
HC ε1 = ε4 ε1 < ε4 −8.44∗∗ µ4 = µ1 µ4 < µ1 −6.23∗∗ 268
HU1 ε5 = ε4 ε5 < ε4 −5.06∗∗ µ4 = µ5 µ4 < µ5 −0.39 178
ε7 = ε4 ε7 < ε4 3.42 µ4 = µ7 µ4 < µ7 −14.06∗∗ 178
ε7 = ε5 ε7 < ε5 9.11 µ5 = µ7 µ5 < µ7 −12.87∗∗ 178
ε2 = ε1 ε2 < ε1 15.68 µ1 = µ2 µ1 < µ2 −24.26∗∗ 358
HU2 ε2 = ε7 ε2 6= ε7 0.11 µ2 = µ7 µ2 6= µ7 −0.35 268
HB1 ε in6 = ε4 ε
in
6 < ε4 −4.64∗∗ µ6 = µ4 µ6 < µ4 0.59 178
ε in8 = ε4 ε
in
8 < ε4 −10.60∗∗ µ8 = µ4 µ8 < µ4 2.91 178
ε in8 = ε
in
6 ε
in
8 < ε
in
6 −5.96∗∗ µ8 = µ6 µ8 < µ6 2.25 178
ε in3 = ε1 ε
in
3 < ε1 5.19 µ3 = µ1 µ3 < µ1 9.09 358
HB2 ε in8 = ε
in
3 ε
in
8 < ε
in
3 −8.07∗∗ µ8 = µ3 µ8 < µ3 −7.00∗∗ 268
HG ε in6 = ε5 ε
in
6 < ε5 −0.07 µ6 = µ5 µ6 < µ5 0.15 178
ε in8 = ε7 ε
in
8 < ε7 −14.01∗∗ µ8 = µ7 µ8 < µ7 −11.17∗∗ 178
ε in3 = ε2 ε
in
3 < ε2 −6.93∗∗ µ3 = µ2 µ3 < µ2 −7.30∗∗ 358
Except for HU2, one-sided t-tests with ‘d.f’ degrees of freedom. The testable implications of section 5.2 cor-
respond to the alternative hypothesis of these tests. For HU2, two-sided t-test with ‘d.f’ degrees of freedom.
HU2 correspond to the null hypothesis of this test. Test statistics rejecting the null hypothesis at the 5% and 1%
significance levels are marked with ∗ and ∗∗ respectively.
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FIGURE 5
Comparison of Price Distributions: Complete Coverage.
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FIGURE 6
Comparison of Price Distributions: Incomplete Coverage
From Table 2, it follows that: (i) µ1 < µ2 and ε1 < ε2, (ii) µ4 < µ7 and ε4 < ε7, (iii) µ5 < µ7
and ε5 < ε7, (iv) µ4 = µ5 and ε4 > ε5. This implies that the data does not support hypothesis
HU1.
Also from Table 2, it follows that: (i) µ1 < µ3 and ε1 < ε in3 , (ii) µ4 < µ8 and ε4 > ε
in
8 , (iii)
µ6 < µ8 and ε in6 > ε
in
8 , (iv) µ4 = µ6 and ε4 > ε
in
6 . This implies that the data does not support
hypothesis HB1, either.
Observation 5. The data does not support the model’s predictions regarding the compar-
ison between Complete Coverage and Incomplete Coverage. 
With respect to the comparison between Complete Coverage and Unselective Incomplete
Coverage, from Table 2, it follows that: (i) µ4 = µ5 < µ7 and µ1 < µ2; (ii) ε5 < ε4 < ε7
and ε1 < ε2. Only the comparison of minimum prices is weakly compatible with the model’s
predictions. The data fails to support the predicted comparison between Complete Coverage
and Unselective Incomplete Coverage, i.e., HU1.
With respect to the comparison between Complete Coverage and Selective Incomplete Cov-
erage, from Table 2, it follows that: (i) µ4 = µ6 < µ8 and µ1 < µ3; (ii) ε in8 = ε
in
6 < ε4 and
ε1 < ε in3 . The data fails to support the predicted comparison between Complete Coverage and
Selective Incomplete Coverage, i.e., HB1.
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Observation 6. The average minimum price is weakly lower under Complete Coverage
than under Selective Incomplete Coverage. 
From Table 2 it follows that: (i) µ1 < µ3, (ii) µ4 = µ6, and (iii) µ4 < µ8. Jointly with
Observation 3, this imply that searchers are better off under Complete Coverage than under
Incomplete Coverage.
Observation 7. Given the type of bias, ratio k/n, and Incomplete Coverage, an increase
in the number of firms in the market leads to a lower average price, and a lower average
minimum price. 
From Table 2 it follows that: (i) µ5 < µ2 and ε5 < ε2, and (ii) µ6 < µ3 and ε6 < ε3. This
observation agrees with the empirical findings of Baye et al. (2003).
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we analyzed the effects on market equilibrium of some information characteristics
of price-comparison search platforms, namely: (i) that they only list the prices of some of
the vendors in the market, and (ii) that their listings may be more favorable to some vendors
than to others. In addition, we analyzed the impact of the number of vendors in the market.
We developed a partial equilibrium search model, and tested its predictions in a laboratory
experiment specifically designed for that purpose.
The model warns us about possible counter-intuitive effects. For example, an increase in the
number of vendors whose prices are listed by the search platform may not imply lower expected
prices. The experimental results confirm some of the model’s predictions and contradict others.
It is a positive finding of our research that the data confirms one of the basic predictions of
our model, as well as of the models of Burdett and Judd (1983) and Varian (1980), concerning
the impact of the number of vendors in the market. This positive finding, reinforces the findings
by Morgan et al. (2006).29 The data also confirms our model’s prediction concerning the im-
pact of the search platform’s sample not being random. Contrary to these positive findings, the
prediction concerning the impact of size of the search platform’s sample receive little, if any,
support from our data. Future research should investigate the behavioral sources of this failure.
For example, it would be interesting to relax the assumption of agents’ risk neutrality and gen-
eralize the model to the case of alternative risk attitudes. However, the resulting setup would
be further complicated by the need of modelling also agents’ beliefs on others’ risk attitudes.
Asymmetric equilibria would emerge, but we would not expect the resulting framework to yield
tractable solutions.
The policy issues underlying are important and complex and require much additional anal-
ysis. Our results contribute to the policy debate with the following four observations.
First, in these markets there is a fundamental conflict of interests between informed and
uninformed consumers. The expected prices paid by these two types of consumers tend to be
affected in opposite ways by parameter changes or policy measures. Hence, policy interventions
29. More recent experimental evidence on this is provided by Orzen (2008).
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are delicate exercises that should weight the interests of all parties. In practice, this balancing
act might be hard to perform.
Second, consumers should not assume that price-comparison search platforms are inde-
pendent parties, whose purpose is to provide them useful information. Search platforms are
self-interested parties, whose interests may be aligned with those of the vendors, instead of the
consumers.30 A policy of mandatory disclosure of the commercial affiliations could be useful.
Third, whether or not search platforms are commercially affiliated with vendors, and ex-
cluding blatant deceptive information, consumers should be encouraged to use search platforms
to both obtain and compare price information. Even when search platforms do not correspond
to their ideal type, consumers are better off by using them than by not using them.
Fourth, the impact of the size and type of the search platform’s sample of prices, and the
number of vendors in the market, should be further investigated. The importance of these mar-
kets is growing rapidly, particularly in internet related environments, and the effects involved
are delicate.
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APPENDIX A. PROOFS
A Nash equilibrium is a n-tuple of cumulative distribution functions over prices, {F1(·), . . . ,Fn(·)},
such that for some Π?j on R
+
0 , and j = 1, . . . ,n: (i) Π j(p) =Π
?
j , for all p on the support of Fj(·),
and (ii) Π j(p)≤Π?j , for all p.
When vendors are identical we focus on symmetric equilibria, in which case: Fj(·) = F(·),
p j = p, p¯ j = p¯ and Π
?
j =Π?, for all j.
Denote by pˆ− j the minimum price charged by any indexed vendor other than vendor j, and
denote by mˆ− j the number of indexed vendors that charge pˆ− j. The profit function of vendor j
when it charges price p j is:
pi j(p j;τ) =

p j
[
λ
n +(1−λ )φ τj
]
if p j < pˆ− j ≤ 1
p j
[
λ
n +
1−λ
mˆ− j φ
τ
j
]
if p j = pˆ− j ≤ 1
p j λn if pˆ− j < p j ≤ 1
0 if 1 < p j.
The next Lemma states some auxiliary results.
Lemma 1. For all j: (i) lτj ≤ p j ≤ p¯ j ≤ 1; (ii) Fτj is continuous on [lτj ,1]; (iii) p¯ j = 1;
(iv) Π?j =
λ
n ; (v) p j = l
τ
j ; (vi) F
τ
j has a connected support. 
Proof of Lemma 1. For τ = s and j = k+1, . . . ,n the proofs are obvious, so consider: (a)
τ = s and j = 1, . . . ,k, and (b) τ = c,u.
(i). For any j, any price p j < lτj or p j > 1 is strictly dominated by p j = 1;
(ii). Suppose not, i.e., suppose that Fτj has a mass point at price p. Let ε > 0 be arbitrarily
small and such that no mass point exists at price p−ε . The expected profits of firm j are:
Π j(p− ε) =(p− ε)λn +(p− ε)(1−λ )φ
τ
j Prob[p− ε < pˆ− j]
+ (p− ε)(1−λ )φ τj Prob[p− ε ≤ p = pˆ− j],
and
Π j(p) = p
λ
n
+ p(1−λ )φ τj Prob[p < pˆ− j]+ p
(1−λ )φ τj
mˆ− j
Prob[p = pˆ j−i].
Subtracting the second expression from the first and taking the limit as ε approached zero,
one obtains
lim
ε→0
[Π j(p− ε)−Π j(p)] = p(1−λ )φ τj
(
mˆ− j−1
mˆ− j
)
Prob[p = pˆ− j]> 0.
Hence, vendor j would increase profit by shifting mass from p to an ε neighborhood
below p. But this implies that it cannot be an equilibrium strategy to maintain a mass
point at p;
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(iii). Suppose not, i.e., suppose p¯ j < 1. Then
Π j(p¯ j) = p¯ j
λ
n
+ p¯ j(1−λ )φ τj [1−F(p¯ j)]k−1 = p¯ j
λ
n
,
since from (ii) there are no mass points at p¯ j λn . However, the payoff from setting a price
equal to 1 is λn > p¯ j
λ
n ;
(iv). Follows from (ii) and (iii);
(v). Parts (ii) and (iv) imply that p j
λ
n + p j(1−λ )φ τj =Π j(p j) = λn . Hence p j = lτj ;
(vi). Suppose not, i.e., suppose there is an interval [pl, ph] satisfying lτj ≤ pl < ph ≤ 1 such that
F(pl) = F(ph). Suppose also that pl is the infimum of all prices p, lτj ≤ p≤ 1. Then pl is
in the support of F(·) and, from (ii) Π?j = Π j(pl) = pl λn + pl(1−λ )φ τj [1−F(pl)]k−1 <
ph λn + ph(1−λ )φ τj [1−F(ph)]k−1 =Π j(ph), a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 1. We show constructively that equilibrium exists. Alternatively, ex-
istence follows from theorem 5 of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986). (i) Use Lemma 1(iv) to set
Π j(p) = pλn + p(1−λ )φ τj [1−F(p)]k−1 = λn . Solving for F(p) the result follows; (ii) Obvi-
ous. 
Proof of Remark 1. (i) Follows from the fact that all firms are indifferent between any
equilibrium price and the monopoly price. (ii) Follows directly from the definition of µc =
lc+
∫ 1
lc(1−Fc)nd p and εc = lc+
∫ 1
lc(1−Fc)d p. 
Theorem 1. (i) εc(n)< εc(n+1); (ii) µc(n)> µc(n+1). 
Proof of Theorem 1. (i) See Morgan et al. (2006); (ii) Follows from (i) and Remark 1(i).
Proof of Corollary 1. Obvious. 
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Obvious; (ii) Follows from Corollary 1 and the Theorem 1;
(iii) Obvious. 
Proof of Corollary 2. (i) Obvious; (ii) Follows from Corollary 1 and the Theorem 1. 
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Obvious; (ii) Follows from (i); (iii) Obvious; (iv) Follows from
(iii). 
Proof of Corollary 3. (i) Obvious; (ii) Obvious; (iii) Follows from (ii); (iv) Follows from
(ii). 
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APPENDIX B. INSTRUCTIONS FOR SUBJECTS (TRANSLATED FROM SPANISH)
• The purpose of this experiment is to study how subjects take decisions in specific economic
contexts. This project has received financial support by public funds. Your decision making
in this session is going to be of great importance for the success of this research. At the
end of the session you will receive a quantity of money in cash which will depend on your
performance during the session.
• The environment in which the experiment takes place is an industry. This industry has the
following characteristics:
(a) a price comparison search platform like the ones on the Internet,
(b) 3 firms, (Treatments 4–8: 6 firms),
(c) 1,200 consumers.
Each firm in the industry produces a homogeneous product, and this product is the same for
all firms.
• Transactions will take place in UMEX (our lab’s Experimental Monetary Units).
• This session will consist of 50 rounds.
• You are one of the 3 firms (Treatments 4–8: 6 firms) in the industry. Your production costs
are zero. Therefore, your profits are equal to your revenue.
• Each round, you and the rest of the firms in the industry have to decide the price at which
you want to sell the product. Price is your only decision variable.
• (Treatments 1 and 4) Each period, a Price search platform lists the prices of all firms in the
industry.
• (Treatments 2, 5 and 7) Each period, a Price search platform lists the prices of 2 firms (Treat-
ment 5: 4 firms) in the industry. More precisely, each round, the price comparison search
platform randomly chooses 2 firms (Treatment 5: 4 firms), whose price will be included in its
price list. The identity of the firms whose price will be included in the list of the price search
platform, will be announced publicly to the members of the industry after the firms’ prices
are posted.
• (Treatments 3, 6 and 8) Each period, a Price search platform lists the prices of 2 firms (Treat-
ment 6: 4 firms) in the industry. More precisely, each round, the price comparison search
platform randomly chooses 2 firms (Treatment 6: 4 firms), whose price will be included in its
price list. The identity of the firms whose price will be included in the list of the price search
platform, will be announced publicly to the members of the industry before the firms’ prices
are posted.
• Each consumer wants to buy one unit of the product per round. The maximum willingness to
pay of each consumer for a unit of the product is 1,000 UMEX. That is, if the price you fix is
higher than 1,000 UMEX, nobody will buy from you.
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• There are two types of consumers. Half of them, i.e., 600 consumers, will read the list of
price created by the search platform. The other half do not actually read the list of prices of
the search engine (maybe because they are not able to do so).
• The consumers who read the price list of the search platform will buy, each period, from
the firm whose price for that period is the lowest among all prices included in the price
list, if such price does not exceed 1,000 UMEX. In case of a “tie” (i.e., several firms fix the
same minimum price) the consumers are distributed evenly among the firms with the same
minimum price.
• The consumers who do not read the search platform’s price list will buy “randomly” from
any vendor, so that this group of consumers will be distributed evenly among all firms in the
industry.
• In each round, 3 firms (Treatments 4–8: 6 firms) forming (together with you) the same in-
dustry, will be randomly drawn among the 18 participants of this session. Therefore, the
probability of competing with the same 2 firms (Treatments 4–8: 5 firms) in 2 different peri-
ods is very low (less than 10%).
• Once the participants have been assigned to the industries, you must set your price. The
master program in the computer will simulate the consumers’ reactions. At the end of each
round, you will see on your screen the information about your own sales, your earnings and
the prices fixed by your competitors in the market.
• At the end of the session you will be paid in cash. Your reward will be determined taking into
account the earnings you accumulate over 10 (randomly selected) out of the total 50 periods.
The exchange rate will be: 1,000,000 UMEX = 10 e.
Thank you very much for your participation. Good luck!
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